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PRELIMINARY REMARKS
The rules relating to the appointment and to a lesserextent the functions of such boards have undergonesigniﬁcant reforms as a result of the Law of 1
October 2004 that made a number of amendments to
Articles 268 and 158 of book 2 of the Netherlands Civil
Code (Burgerlijke Wetbook), which are applicable to large (or
“structure”) private and public companies (NVs and BVs)
respectively, as well as certain alterations to other relevant
provisions of Dutch law governing employee participation.
“Structure” companies are deﬁned in Articles 263(2)
and 153(2) of Book 2 in an identical manner. A company
is a large or structure company if: (i) its issued share capital
together with its reserves according to the balance sheet
amounts to at least €16 million; (ii) the company, or a
dependent company, is legally bound to set up a works
council; and (iii) the company generally employs at least
100 persons in the Netherlands. The amount of €16
million is subject to periodic revision. The obligation to
appoint a works council is generally imposed on companies
employing more than 50 persons.
Such companies are required to set up supervisory
boards which are invested with particular functions. Other
companies may set them up and thus use a dual board
system on a voluntary basis. The appointment of the
supervisory board in large or structure companies used to
be based upon a system of cooptation, according to which
it appointed its own members. Those representing the
employees were recommended by the works council, but
their appointment could be prevented by the general
meeting. Disputes about such appointments could be
referred by the supervisory board to the Enterprise
Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeals. The system
of co-optation has been replaced by a new method of
appointing the supervisory boards of large companies,
which is described below, where the dismissal of such
members and their functions are also considered. The
Dutch rules of law applicable to large companies only apply
in a weakened form to large Dutch companies which
belong to an international group of companies. The
applicable rules of law governing the appointment of the
members of the supervisory board of a large Dutch
company are principally contained in Articles 265 and 155
of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code. Other provisions,
however, are of signiﬁcant relevance.
APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE
SUPERVISORY BOARD
The new provisions governing the appointment of
members of the supervisory board of a large company owe
their existence to a proposal of the Netherlands Economic
and Social Council in 2001, which considered matters
relating to corporate governance. The new provisions
contained in the Law of 1 October 2004 give the principal
role in appointing members of the supervisory board to
the general meeting, acting on a proposal which must be
made by that board. The board is given an enhanced right
(the Dutch term is bindende) of nominating up to one third
of the members of the supervisory board, who are
recommended by the works council unless it objects to
such recommendation. Article 270 of Book 2, and Article
160 thereof, which may be intended to prevent the
formation of factions, provides that trade union ofﬁcials
who are active within the enterprise or one dependent on
it, are ineligible for appointment to the supervisory board
is persons having a service contract with the company or
one dependent on it.
By Articles 268(9) and 158(9) of Book 2 of the Civil
Code, the general meeting may reject a proposal for the
appointment of a member of the board by itself or by the
supervisory board, or by the works council by means of a
resolution passed by an enhanced majority of the passing of
votes of at least one third of the holders of the issued
capital represented. The new provisions governing the
appointment of the members of the supervisory board
seem to have weakened the position of that board
regarding such appointment. These provisions seem to
have been inﬂuenced by considerations relating to
satisfactory corporate governance.
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Period of office
A member of the supervisory board of a large company
holds ofﬁce for a period of four years from his
appointment according to Articles 271(2) and 161(2) of
Book 2, which apply respectively to private and public
companies. If the large company is listed, it will be subject
to the Netherlands Corporate Governance Code,
according to which the period of ofﬁce for a member of the
supervisory board is four years, which may be renewed for
a maximum period of four years each.
Dismissal from office
The period of ofﬁce of a member of the supervisory
board may be terminated involuntarily as the result of a
decision of the Enterprise Chamber of the Court of
Appeals of Amsterdam. The relevant rules of law are set
out in Articles 271(2) and 161(2) of Book 2 of the Civil
Code, which apply respectively to Dutch private and public
companies. A decision to dismiss a member of the
supervisory board may be requested by the board itself, the
works council, or by the shareholders in general meeting,
or the shareholders committee. It may only be taken by the
Enterprise Chamber in the event of breaches of duties,
other important reasons, or in the event of any signiﬁcant
changes in circumstances, for instance the merger of the
company with another, which made it unreasonable for the
relevant person to continue as a member.
Articles 272a and 161a of Book 2, which apply
respectively to private and public companies, gave a
signiﬁcant power of dismissal to the general meeting.
When it has lost conﬁdence in the supervisory board as a
whole, it may take proceedings to dismiss it without the
intervention of the Enterprise Chamber. It has to act by an
enhanced majority and at least one third of holders of the
issued capital must be represented at the meeting.
Furthermore, the proposed resolution must be submitted
to the works council at least 30 days before the relevant
meeting. The directors of the large company must request
the Enterprise Chamber of the Court of Appeals of
Amsterdam to appoint one or more directors on a
temporary basis such that a new supervisory board may be
constituted. The articles of a company may not depart
from this procedure. However, the new supervisory board
members remain competent to make nominations for the
appointment of members thereof by the general meeting.
It would seem that the new procedure would only be used
in serious cases, but its existence may be thought to
weaken the position of the supervisory board.
TASKS OF THE SUPERVISORY BOARD
The supervisory board has the normal tasks of any
supervisory board of exercising supervision and tendering
advice set out in Articles 250 and 140 of Book 2 of the
Dutch Commercial Code, applicable respectively to Dutch
private and public companies. It also has signiﬁcant
additional tasks, including the appointment and dismissal
of the directors in accordance with Articles 272 and 162 of
Book 2 and by Articles 274 and 164, the approval of the
passing of certain resolutions of private and public
companies, for example resolutions governing the issue of
shares and bonds by such companies. The supervisory
board is no longer entrusted with the adoption of the
annual accounts. It cannot dismiss the directors until the
general meeting has considered the matter. If it purports to
do so, it act is void.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Dutch system governing large companies results in
some degree of employee participation, and is designed to
be one which, as far as possible, does not lead to
confrontation. The role of the supervisory board has been
signiﬁcantly weakened since the reforms made in 2004,
whilst there has been a considerable strengthening in the
position of the general meeting. Whatever its merits may
be, it does not seem one which will be adopted by a
signiﬁcant number of other countries. This is because of its
balanced compromise character which is hardly likely to
appeal to both parties to industrial relations. The very
detailed character of certain of the provisions may not
make them very acceptable models for legal transplants.
This is especially true of those governing total and partial
exemptions from the regime.
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